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Abstract
This paper reports analysis of the impact of Kenya’s Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children Programme on the household decisions on productive activities using data from a 
randomized experimental design. Results show that the programme had a positive and significant 
impact on food consumption coming from home production, accumulation of productive assets, 
especially on the ownership of small livestock and on formation of nonfarm enterprise, especially 
for females. The programme has provided more flexibility to families in terms of labour allocation 
decisions, particularly for those who are geographically isolated. The programme was also found 
to have reduced child labour, an important objective of the programme. However we find very 
little impact of the programme on direct indicators of crop production.
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1. Introduction
Over the past 15 years, a growing number of African governments have launched safety net 
programmes to provide assistance to the elderly and children, as well as households that are 
ultra-poor, labour-constrained, and/or caring for orphan and vulnerable children. Cash 
transfer programmes in African countries have tended to be unconditional (where regular 
and predictable transfers of money are given directly to beneficiary households without 
conditions or labour requirements) rather than conditional (more common in Latin 
America), which require recipients to meet certain conditions such as using basic health 
services or sending their children to school. Most of these programmes seek to reduce 
poverty and vulnerability by improving food consumption, nutritional and health status and 
school attendance.
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The Kenya Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) is 
the government’s flagship social protection programme, reaching over 150,000 households 
across the country as of December, 2012, with the ultimate goal of providing coverage to 
300,000 households. A flat monthly transfer of Ksh 1500 (approximately US$21; increased 
in the 2011/12 budget from Ksh 1500 to Ksh 2000) is given to those households who are 
ultra-poor and contain OVC (Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team, 2012). OVC are defined as 
household residents between zero and 17 years old with at least one deceased parent, or a 
parent who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. The value of the 
transfer represented an average of 14 percent of the expenditures of the beneficiary 
households in 2011. Given the fixed transfer amount regardless of household size, in per 
capita terms the transfer is larger for smaller-sized households. Due to inflation, the real 
value of the transfer declined by 40 percent between 2007 and 2009, and by an additional 15 
percent between 2009 and 2011. The Government of Kenya began implementing the CT-
OVC as a pilot in 2004. After a three-year demonstration period, the programme was 
formally approved by Cabinet, integrated into the national budget and began expanding 
rapidly in 2007. Further details on the programme and the targeting procedure can be found 
in Handa et al. (2012).
Although the primary goal of the programme is to build human capital and to improve the 
care of OVC, there are good reasons to believe that cash transfer programmes, and the CT-
OVC programme in particular, can have impacts on household decision making including 
labour supply, accumulation of productive assets and productive activities. Most 
beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes in Sub Saharan Africa live in rural areas, depend 
on subsistence agriculture and live in places where markets for financial services (such as 
credit and insurance), labour, goods and inputs are lacking or do not function well. Cash 
transfers often represent a significant share of household income, and when provided in a 
regular and predicable fashion, may help households in overcoming the obstacles that block 
their access to credit or cash.
There is robust evidence from numerous countries (especially Latin America and 
increasingly Sub Saharan Africa) that cash transfers have leveraged sizeable gains in access 
to health and education services, as measured by increases in school enrolment (particularly 
for girls) and use of health services (particularly preventative health, and health monitoring 
for children and pregnant women) (e.g., Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Barrientos and DeJong, 
2004; Davis et al., 2012). However, there is relatively limited empirical evidence on the 
productive impact of cash transfer programmes, particularly in the African context. Todd et 
al. (2010) and Gertler et al. (2012) find that the Mexican PROGRESA programme led to 
increased land use, livestock ownership, crop production and agricultural expenditures and a 
greater likelihood of operating a microenterprise. Soares et al. (2010) find from their 
analysis of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme in Paraguay that beneficiary 
households invested between 45–50 percent more in agricultural production and that the 
programme also increased the probability that households would acquire livestock by 6 
percent. Martinez (2004) found that the BONOSOL pension programme in Bolivia had a 
positive impact on animal ownership, expenditures on farm inputs, and crop output, 
although the specific choice of investment differs according to the gender of the beneficiary.
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In contrast, Maluccio (2010) finds that the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) programme in 
Nicaragua had muted impacts on the acquisition of farm implements and no impact on 
livestock or land ownership (Maluccio, 2010). The results in Nicaragua may stem from the 
implementation of the RPS pilot, in particular the low levels of transfers (as share of total 
income) combined with a stronger programme emphasis and pressure on how the transfers 
should be spent (Davis et al., 2010).
On the other hand, CCTs in Latin America have been shown to have little impact on work 
incentives and adult labour supply. Studies of Bolsa Familia in Brazil (Ribas and Soares, 
2111; Foguel and Paes de Barrios, 2010; Teixeira, 2010), PROGRESA in Mexico (Parker 
and Skoufias, 2000; Skoufias and di Maro, 2008; Alzua et al., 2010), the Red de Proteccion 
Social in Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores, 2005; Maluccio, 2010; Alzua et al., 2010), the 
BDH programme in Ecuador (Edmonds and Schady, 2008) and PRAF in Honduras (Alzua 
et al., 2010; Galiani and McEwan, 2012), using a variety of approaches, have not found 
significant impact on participation in wage employment by adults, female or male, nor 
reallocation between agricultural and non agricultural sectors. There is some evidence, 
however, that CCTs have modestly reduced time spent working, for males in Nicaragua 
(Maluccio and Flores, 2005) and females in Brazil (Teixeira, 2010), and substitution 
between wage and domestic home work in Brazil (Ribas and Soares, 2011). And Handa et 
al. (2010) find that agricultural households benefiting from PROGRESA were less likely to 
comply with conditionality due to time conflicts with agricultural work on their own farms. 
Finally, a number of programmes have been found to lead to reduced child labour (see the 
review in Fiszbein and Shady, 2009).
With respect to Sub-Saharan Africa, Covarrubias et al. (2012) and Boone et al. (2013) found 
that the Malawi SCT programme led to increased investment in agricultural assets, including 
crop implements and livestock and increased satisfaction of household consumption by own 
production. Gilligan et al. (2009) found that Ethiopian households with access to both the 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) as well as complementary packages of 
agricultural support were more likely to be food secure, to borrow for productive purposes, 
use improved agricultural technologies, and operate their own nonfarm business activities. 
In a later study, Berhane et al. (2011) found that the PSNP led to a significant improvement 
in food security status for those that had participated in the programme for 5 years versus 
those who only received one year of benefits. Moreover, those households that participated 
in PNSP as well as the complementary programmes had significantly higher grain 
production and fertilizer use. However, beneficiaries did not experience faster asset growth 
(livestock, land or farm implements) as a result of the programmes (Gilligan et al., 2009; 
Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007).
Early evidence from cash transfers in SSA shows a mixed picture in terms of labour supply. 
Gilligan et al. (2009) in Ethiopia found that households with access to both the PSNP and a 
complementary package of agricultural support showed no indication of disincentive effects 
on labour supply, while Ardington et al. (2008) find that the South African Old Age Pension 
had a positive effect on adult labour supply arguing that the OAP relieved financial and 
child care constraints. On the other hand, Covarrubias et al. (2012) found that the Malawi 
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cash transfer programme led to shift from agricultural wage labour and child work off farm 
to increased labour allocation to on farm activities by both adults and children.
Building on the existing literature, we analyze the productive impact of the Kenya CT-OVC 
programme on the accumulation of productive assets, food consumption by source, resource 
allocation among productive activities and changes in the labour supply of household 
members. The impact evaluation strategy was based on a randomized cluster longitudinal 
design, and the framework for empirical analysis is based on a comparison of programme 
beneficiaries with a group of non-beneficiaries serving as controls, all interviewed before the 
programme began and again four years later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual framework on 
the link between cash transfers, productivity activities and labour supply. Survey design and 
data collection methods are discussed in Section 3. The fourth section presents the analytical 
methods, with emphasis on empirical models and hypothesized relationships. The main 
analytical results are presented and discussed in Section 5, followed by the conclusions in 
Section 6.
2. Cash transfer and productive activities – conceptual framework
The concept of cash transfer programmes leading to economic and productive impacts is 
built around the hypothesis that the provision of regular and predictable cash transfers to 
very poor households in the context of missing or malfunctioning markets has the potential 
to generate economic and productive impacts at the household level and to stimulate the 
local economy through the networks that link individuals, households, businesses and 
institutions.
To understand the influence of transfers on agricultural production, we start by considering 
how agricultural households make decisions. A common approach toward investigating 
household decision-making in these contexts is to employ an agricultural household model 
where households are both utility-maximizing consumers of agricultural goods and profit-
maximizing producers of those goods, and potentially face market constraints (Singh et al., 
1986). In this model, when markets function perfectly, production and consumption 
decisions can be viewed as “separable”—profit maximization and utility maximization are 
solved recursively. First, the agricultural household maximizes profit from agricultural 
production based on standard economic theory. Second, given that profit, they seek to 
maximize utility. All prices are determined exogenously through market mechanisms and 
households are price takers. If markets are perfect, spending and investment in agriculture 
are optimal and the effect of the transfer should only be on consumption.
In contrast to the assumptions underlying this model, agricultural households in developing 
countries often face significant barriers in multiple markets. For example, high transaction 
costs in staple markets can often make self-sufficiency the optimal choice (Key et al., 2000). 
Labour transaction costs, such as monitoring worker effort, can prevent households from 
hiring labour and to prefer the use of family labour, making family and hired labour 
imperfect substitutes. Poor households often face difficulties in accessing credit due to lack 
of assets to use as collateral or credit rationing that might occur due to factors such as 
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adverse selection, asymmetric information, or government policies (Feder et al., 1990). 
Liquidity and credit constraints are two of the main factors limiting poor agricultural 
households from investing optimally (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Fenwick and Lyne, 
1999; Lopez and Romano, 2000; Barrett et al., 2001; Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2005). 
Without access to adequate credit markets or insurance, agricultural households may adopt 
low-risk, low-return strategies, either in production or the diversification of income sources. 
Agricultural households will often sell more than the optimal amount of labour off farm in 
order to provide a variety of sources of income.
When faced with multiple market failures agricultural households may then make decisions 
to ensure that they have enough food to eat, but not necessarily what would be the most 
profitable. For example, to minimize the risk of high prices for staple foods they may 
produce more of these foods to ensure food security even if they could make more money 
from a cash crop. In the face of such constraints, the production and consumption decisions 
of agricultural households can be viewed as “non-separable”, in the sense they are jointly 
determined (Singh et al., 1986).
If household production and consumption decisions are non-separable, cash transfers may be 
able to help overcome several of these constraints. First, if correctly implemented, transfers 
provide a guaranteed steady source of income at regular (e.g. monthly or bimonthly) 
intervals. This assurance, especially for agricultural households which are less likely to have 
regular sources of income, might allow households to adopt riskier strategies with a higher 
rate of return. This guaranteed flow of income can help make up for failures in the insurance 
market. Secondly, the cash can be used for productive investment by providing liquidity. 
This liquidity can help farmers move closer to the optimal level of inputs when credit 
markets have failed. Such investments can be complemented by household labour and lead 
to increased agricultural production by the household.
Alternative theoretical models can also help understand the potential impact of a cash 
transfer programme on labour supply decisions. Becker’s Time and Household Production 
theory (1965) suggests that time allocation decisions involve a trade-off between time 
devoted to domestic activities such as domestic production or leisure, which generate utility, 
and time devoted to paid labour, which yields income. An increase in household income 
unrelated to work enhances the value of time dedicated to housework activities, relative to 
the time dedicated to paid work. Cash transfer programmes can potentially create negative 
incentives for time allocated to paid work—i.e., the income effect discussed by Parker and 
Skoufias (2000)—while at the same time providing incentives for housework activities 
which promote well-being. This impact may vary by gender: given cultural norms and the 
constraints of caring for children, income effects may lead women to withdraw from the 
labour market while men increase their leisure. On the other hand, a substitution effect 
might also occur when there is an increase in adult labour supply in order to compensate for 
a reduction in child labour in response to a conditionality related to school attendance which 
is the case for most CCTs. Further, meeting conditions, e.g., health clinic requirements, may 
conflict with time spent working—and this may well vary by gender (Kabeer, 2009). While 
the Kenya CT-OVC is unconditional, the programme does involve social messaging (i.e., 
the money is suggested to be used on children, health, and improved nutrition).
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The specific hypotheses we wish to test in this paper are the following: does the Kenya CT-
OVC (i) lead to an increase in investment in agricultural and non agricultural productive 
assets and activities, (ii) increase food consumption obtained from own production, and (iii) 
result in a shift in adult labour towards own agricultural and non agricultural activities and 
away from casual labour and (iv) result in heterogeneous impact by gender (v) reduce the 
time children spend at work.
3. Programme evaluation design and data
3.1 Programme targeting and data type
Prior to programme expansion of the CT-OVC in 2007, UNICEF designed a social 
experiment to track the impact of the programme on a range of household welfare indicators 
including child health and schooling and economic productivity. The evaluation was 
contracted to a private consulting firm, Oxford Policy Management (OPM), and entailed a 
cluster randomized longitudinal design, with a baseline household survey (and related 
community survey) conducted in mid 2007 and a 24 month follow-up in 2009.
The design of the impact evaluation followed the programme’s targeting process, which 
involved three stages. In stage one, seven districts were chosen for inclusion into the 
programme based on overall poverty levels and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (directly 
related to OVC). The ethical rationale for the design was that the programme could not 
expand to all eligible locations at the same time, so locations whose entry would occur later 
in the expansion cycle were used as control sites to measure impact. Thus in the second 
stage, within each of 7 districts that were scheduled to be included in this expansion phase, 
four locations were identified as eligible, two of which were subsequently randomized out of 
the initial expansion phase and served as control locations (Figure 1). Targeting of 
households was carried out in the intervention locations according to standard programme 
operation guidelines in the third stage. Each location formed a committee of citizens charged 
with identifying potentially eligible households based on criteria of ultra-poverty and 
containing at least one OVC as defined above. The list of eligible households was sent to the 
programme’s central office (located within the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social 
Development), which then administered a detailed socioeconomic questionnaire to confirm 
eligibility. The final number of households that entered the programme in each district 
depended on funding to that district but approximately 20 percent of the poorest households 
in each location were enrolled in the programme. The criteria for ultimate inclusion was 
based on age—child headed households received highest priority, followed by age of head 
of household (with oldest getting priority). Since the programme was not scheduled to be 
implemented during this phase in the control locations, programme targeting was 
‘simulated’ in order to identify a sample of households that were comparable to those in 
identified as eligible in treatment locations. The simulation meant that the first stage of 
targeting was replicated in control locations but not the second stage, since a final eligibility 
list was not required. Households in both the treatment and control arms were surveyed prior 
to their knowledge that they were selected into the programme. The targeting performance 
of the programme is reported in Handa et al. (2012).
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A second follow up study of the evaluation sample (this time under the leadership of the 
University of North Carolina) was conducted four years after baseline between May and 
July, 2011. Both the baseline and first follow up surveys had collected only limited data on 
production activities and labour supply, thus in order to measure the economic impacts of 
CT interventions at the individual and household level, additional data were collected in the 
2011 follow-up. First, to measure the investment impacts of the programme, data were 
collected on livestock, agricultural asset non-agricultural asset and durable goods ownership. 
Respondents also provided information on land ownership and acquisition. Crop level 
information obtained included harvest, sales, own consumption and in kind gifts, as well as 
by-products obtained, sold and consumed. A livestock production module captured animal 
stocks, revenues from sales of live and slaughtered animals, as well as of animal by-
products. Additional detailed information on changes in the labour allocation of household 
members to off-farm and on-farm activities was also collected. The survey also included a 
small module on non agricultural business operated by the household.
For this paper, we rely on data collected at baseline (2007) and the second round follow up 
in 2011. Not having data on some variables for the 2007 survey means that for many of the 
outcome variables of interest we have only one data point (no baseline). This limits our 
ability to control for time-invariant unobservables in the impact estimation for some of the 
outcome variables with no baseline information.
3.2 Characteristics of evaluation sample, attrition and balance
The original OPM evaluation sample includes four groups of households: treatment and 
control households, and non-eligible OVC households in intervention and control localities. 
The latter two groups were included in the baseline survey in order to assess the targeting 
effectiveness of the programme but these households were not surveyed in the 2009 or 2011 
rounds.
Table 1 report the sample sizes for each survey round for eligible intervention and control 
households only. Approximately one-third of the sample is control households and the 
sample size at the 2007 baseline is 2294. Attrition was fairly substantial between 2007 and 
2009 at 18 percent, but was reduced considerably to only 5 percent in the 2011 round. All 
three rounds of field work were conducted by Research Solutions Africa, a private research 
firm based in Nairobi; the field work report for the 2011 survey is provided by Otienoh 
(2011).
A number of variables are used in the analysis in order to set the context and establish the 
validity of the counterfactual for assessing impact. Two sets of variables are used: (i) those 
linked to programme eligibility criteria, and (ii) general variables that provide information 
on basic characteristics of the household and adults in the household. Table 2 shows baseline 
summary statistics for these variables. Statistical tests of difference are performed 
comparing baseline control and treatment groups to determine if the experimental procedure 
used to create the treatment and control groups created a valid counterfactual and, if not, to 
help determine what characteristics are of concern. Table 2 indicates that the first stage 
targeting (based on OVC and poverty) was accurate in control households. Both treatment 
and control households are comparable across poverty indicators. However there are 
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significant differences in baseline characteristics across the treatment and control groups for 
a number of variables related to household demographic structure and individual 
characteristics; treatment households have heads who are about nine years older than control 
households (due to the priority ranking of the programme), are more likely to be male and 
have less education. Control households have more prime-age adults (age greater than 18) in 
the household relative to treatment households.
These differences are not surprising given the simulation of targeting in control locations 
and the small number of communities (only 28 locations) included in the treatment and 
control groups. With a sufficiently large number of communities, the expectation would be 
that treatment and control groups would, on average, prioritize different types of poor in 
similar ways. With a relatively small number of communities, however, differences emerge 
even with randomization. Of course, these differences suggest a need to make adjustments to 
data to ensure unbiased estimates of impact and these adjustments are discussed in the 
methods section below.
We have also looked at selected characteristics at baseline for households from each of the 
three survey rounds for treatment and control households. This helps us understand the 
degree of non-random attrition as well as the comparability of households in the two arms. 
Results show that the differences observed between the different arms are essentially the 
same across households in each of the three waves of the study. In other words, there is no 
significant change in the composition of households across the two arms over time, which 
supports the idea that attrition is random and not systematic across the survey rounds. For 
more details on the sample and a discussion of attrition, see Handa et al. (2012).
3.2 Summary statistics
Table 3 presents summary of ownership of productive assets and participation in productive 
activities. A large majority of beneficiaries in the evaluation sample are agricultural 
producers; over 80 percent of beneficiaries grow crops, and three quarters have livestock. 
Agriculture households in the sample, as would be expected, have modest levels of assets—
around 2.6 acres of agricultural land (Table 3), an assortment of animals and low levels of 
education. Agricultural producers also own a variety of tools and implements. Only 16 
percent of households used credit in 2011, and of these, less than half used credit for 
investment in productive activities. Of those who did not use credit, the vast majority felt 
they had no means to repay loans. Approximately one/third of households had some small 
business activity in 2011. Both male and female-headed households reported that own 
savings were the principal first source of capital for their nonfarm enterprise, followed by 
gifts, loans and sales of assets. Nevertheless, the CT-OVC transfer was reported as the most 
important second source of capital for female-headed households (over 30 percent) and 
second most important for male-headed households (just under 20 percent). Averaged over 
beneficiary households, the percentage rises to almost 50 percent, indicating that the transfer 
is perceived as a factor in investment in nonfarm enterprises.
The importance of agriculture is also seen in the allocation of household labour supply 
(Table 4). Over half of all adults work on their own farm, with a somewhat higher percent of 
women (59 versus 52 percent). A quarter of all adults work for wages (31 percent men and 
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In this paper we seek to answer the question: “How would cash transfer beneficiaries have 
fared in absence of the programme?” As it is impossible to observe a household both 
participating in the programme and not participating, the goal is to compare participants 
with non-participants who are as similar as possible except for the fact that they are not 
beneficiaries. Creating a valid counterfactual is crucial to producing reliable estimates of 
programme effects. By comparing outcomes between these two groups the average impacts 
of the cash transfer programme can be estimated. Although on average the targeting 
emphasis of the treatment and control communities may have differed, the random 
assignment of eligible communities into treatment and control groups suggests similarities 
between the groups—that is, the groups are not radically different and tend to be poor with 
limited assets. These imply a need to adjust the baseline data to create a more reasonable 
counterfactual.
Towards this end, we use two approaches: a difference-in-difference estimator and a single 
difference approach combined with inverse probability weighting. When baseline data are 
not available, as is the case for some of our outcome variables (i.e. those that are observed 
only after the implementation of programme), single difference method can be applied. 
When panel data are available with pre and post intervention information, which is the case 
with some of our outcome variables, we use a difference-in-difference approach. Since 
baseline differences between treatment and control are primarily linked to observable 
demographic characteristics, for both approaches an emphasis is placed on these variables in 
ensuring an adequate estimate of impact.
For all variables with adequate baseline data, a difference-in-difference, or double difference 
(DD) estimator can be specified as follows:
(1)
where t − 1 and t represent time periods before and after the introduction of the cash transfer 
programme and the binary indicator D refers to programme assignment at the baseline. The 
panel nature of the data provides the option of using a before-after comparison of control 
and treatment because it compares the difference between control and treatment as well as 
before and after.
By taking the difference in outcomes for the treatment group before and after receiving the 
cash transfer, and subtracting the difference in outcomes for the control group before and 
after the cash transfer was disbursed, DD is able to control for pre-treatment differences 
between the two groups, and in particular the time invariant unobservable factors that cannot 
be accounted for otherwise (Woodridge, 2002). The key assumption is that differences 
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between treated and control households remain constant throughout the duration of the 
project. If prior outcomes incorporate transitory shocks that differ for treatment and 
comparison households, DD estimation interprets such shocks as representing a stable 
difference, and estimates will contain a transitory component that does not represent the true 
programme effect.
When differences between treatment and control groups at the baseline exist, the DD 
estimator with conditioning variables has the advantage of minimizing the standard errors as 
long as the effects are unrelated to the treatment and are constant over time (Wooldridge, 
2002). Control variables are most easily introduced by turning to a regression framework 
which is convenient for the DD or by combining DD with propensity score matching or DD 
with inverse probability weighting (DD-IPW). Equation 2 presents the regression equivalent 
of DD with covariates and/or IPW;
(2)
where Yit is the outcome indicator of interest; Dit is a dummy equal to 1 if household i 
received the treatment; Rt is a time dummy equal to 0 for the baseline and to 1 for the follow 
up round; Rt * Dit is the interaction between the intervention and time dummies and, μit is an 
error term. To control for household and community characteristics that may influence the 
outcome of interest beyond the treatment effect alone, we add in X i, a vector of household 
and community characteristics to control for observable differences across households at the 
baseline which could have an effect on Yit. These factors are not only those for which some 
differences may be observed across treatment and control at the baseline, but also ones 
which could have some explanatory role in the estimation of Yit. As for coefficients, β0 is a 
constant term; β1 controls for the time invariant differences between the treatment and 
control; β2 represents the effect of going from the baseline to the follow-up period, and β3 is 
the double difference estimator, which captures the treatment effect.
We employed single difference combined with IPW (SD-IPW) approach when baseline data 
are not available. It is important to point out that unlike the DD, SD-IPW estimation 
procedure is not robust against time-invariant unobservables therefore results from the SD 
should be interpreted with these caveats in mind. The regression equivalent of SD-IPW can 
be expressed as follows:
(3)
We use the method of inverse probability weighting by specifying a propensity score model. 
Inverse probability weighting derives weights from the propensity score, where these are 
defined by the inverse of the propensity score if the subject receives treatment and the 
inverse of 1 minus the propensity score if the subject receives the control. Propensity score 
is defined as the probability of receiving treatment given the measured covariates 
 where Z is a vector of control variables). In the case of DD-IPW or 
SD-IPW, control observations are assigned weights equal to the inverse of their propensity 
Asfaw et al. Page 10






















score; i.e., , and treatment observations receive a weight equal to one. 
Applying these weights1 to control households effectively reweights the distribution of 
observable characteristics included in  to be like that of the treatment group. Said 
differently, control observations that are dissimilar to the treatment group will have a 
near zero and a weight near zero; conversely, control observations who are similar to the 
treatment group will receive a higher weight. One advantage of the weighting approach is 
that it is considered to be “doubly robust”: if either the propensity model or the outcome 
equation is correctly specified the estimator will be consistent. Therefore for this paper 
following Rubin (1977) as suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2001), we combine the IPW 
estimator with the regression adjustment in the analysis of individual and household level 
outcomes as presented above.
Any method that uses the propensity score requires that all relevant confounders are 
included in the model and that this model is specified correctly to validate the conditional 
exchangeability assumption. As with all observational studies, inference is only valid under 
the strong assumption of there being no unmeasured confounders. This is crucial to allowing 
the causal interpretation placed on the parameters but is, unfortunately, untestable. Ensuring 
that a region of common support exists is necessary in the weighting approach to avoid 
observations with extremely large weights, which can yield estimates with high variance and 
undue influence on results (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). For both DD-IPW and SD-IPW, 
we calculate clustered standard errors at the community level (location level which is also 
unit of randomization for this study) for household level outcomes, and we cluster the 
standard errors at the household level for individual level outcomes. In the subsequent 
section we will discuss in detail the estimation procedure of the propensity scores and the 
overall results of the common support and balance.
4.2 Estimation of propensity scores
We estimate three sets of propensity scores—for household level outcomes we estimate 
propensity score at the household level, while for individual level outcomes we generate 
propensity score at the individual level, overall and by gender. Alternatively we could have 
estimated household level weights and then disaggregated the analysis at the individual 
level. However, given the importance of individual level variables in the labour allocation 
decision, and the existence of at least some limited information at baseline on individual 
labour market participation, we decided to use propensity scores generated at individual 
level.
The baseline data provide a rich set of variables to help identify programme participation. In 
the baseline survey implemented in 2007, the criteria used to target programme beneficiaries 
are documented. This enables us to identify the targeting component of the participation 
decision by including the specific eligibility criteria as control variables in the participation 
regression which is estimated using a logit model (Annex 1 and 2). At the household level 
1Note that propensity weights are also multiplied by survey sampling weights.
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the set of observable variables includes household characteristics such as age, gender, 
education of the household head, household size, dependency ratio, sex ratio, number of 
OVC in the household; poverty indicators such as income sources, access to drinking water; 
household assets such as ownership of bicycles, blankets, mosquito nets, land and livestock 
holding, consumption expenditure; community level indicators such as access to roads, 
distance to daily market, access to telephone and finally district fixed effects. Individuals’ 
characteristics at baseline were used in addition to the above variables when estimating the 
participation equation for individuals. Specifically these included participation and type of 
labour activity, age, education, marital status, and health.
Evidence on the result of re-weighting can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the distribution 
of the estimated propensity scores. As shown in Figure 2 on the left side, the unweighted 
distribution of the propensity score for the control groups is more negatively skewed to the 
right. However on the right side, with weighting the distribution of the propensity score of 
the control groups is similar to the distribution of the treatment group. A similar picture is 
seen in Figure 3 for the distribution of propensity score generated at individual level.
Given that the analysis does not condition on all covariates, but on the propensity score, 
there is a need to check if the weighting procedure is able to balance the distribution of the 
variables used in the construction of the propensity score. After some experimentation we 
have settled on a preferred specification of the participation model for which we cannot 
reject the null of mean equality of baseline characteristics between (reweighted) treatment 
and control households. Also reported in Annex 3a and 3b are weighted means of the 
baseline characteristics, where the weights are constructed from estimated propensity scores. 
Testing for differences in these weighted means across the treatment and control groups 
reveals no significant differences. The fact that the weights can balance the beeline 
characteristics across the two groups provides motivations for their use and as a result 
results presented in this paper for both SD and DD rely solely on the weighted regressions. 
Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), we use IPW by combining the propensity score 
with regression analysis rather than PSM. Just over 4 percent of observations are outside of 
common support in the household level IPW, while the original and (post IPW) final number 
of observations for the individual level analysis (including by gender) can be found in 
Annex4.
4.3. Heterogeneity of programme impacts
The average treatment effect of participation in the CT-OVC may mask differential impacts 
of the programme on subgroups of households, for example, among female and male headed 
households. We use two approaches to determine the existence of these differential effects. 
For all household level equations, we divide the sample of households into female and male 
headed households and by household size. Since the transfer is a fixed amount per 
household regardless of household size, the per capita transfer amount is larger for smaller 
households, and we would expect the impact of the programme to be different for 
households with a smaller number of members compared to a household with a larger 
number of members. For the labour allocation equations at the individual level, we divide 
the sample into males and females and perform separate analysis on each group. For these 
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individual level equations we interact treatment (in separate equations) with individual age 
and chronic illness status, as well as with household distance to market, adult household 
members and regional dummies.
5. Results
In this section we discuss our findings for the average treatment effects of the Kenya CT-
OVC programme over four broad groups of outcome variables— food consumption, 
productive assets, non agricultural business activities and labour supply. When the baseline 
information is available for a given outcome variable, we employ a DD-IPW estimator in a 
multivariate framework. Otherwise, we use the SD-IPW estimator as described above.
5.1. Impact on food consumption
One of the most consistent findings regarding the impact of cash transfer programmes is 
their contribution to reducing hunger and food insecurity. Often the most immediate impact 
of cash transfer programmes for the very poor relates to basic consumption needs, 
particularly nutrition and food security through a direct increase in purchasing power 
(Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007). Table 5 presents the average difference between the 
control and treated groups in components of food consumption expenditure2. Results from 
the DD estimator with IPW show a positive and significant impact on consumption of 
animal products such as dairy and eggs, meat and fish, cooking oil and in consumption of 
fruits across household size and gender line. The results show no significant impact on 
consumption expenditure of cereals and legumes. The average treatment effect for food 
spending on dairy and eggs is 0.123, which is equivalent to a 12.3 percentage point increase 
as a result of the programme.
As expected, the results of the disaggregated analysis show considerable variation in the 
impact of the programme across gender and household size. The analysis shows no effect of 
the programme on spending on most of the food consumption categories for households with 
larger number of members but shows large, positive, and significant effects on three of the 
outcomes (dairy and eggs, meat and fish and fruit) for households with smaller number of 
members. The programme tends to have larger and positive impact on female-headed 
compared to male-headed households. For instance, the programme results in a statistically 
significant 16 percentage point increase in consumption of animal products for female 
headed households but only a 4.5 percentage point increase for male headed households. 
The only one exception where the impact is positive and significant for male-headed 
households is in the consumption of cooking oil.
Information was collected on the primary source of specific types of food consumption, with 
own production, purchases and gifts as the possible sources. We have used proportion of 
food consumption from own production as an indirect proxy to measure the linkages 
between diet diversity and food security (see Todd et al., 2010). Table 6 shows the DD with 
2For each outcome variable we estimated an unweighted comparison, DD-IPW without controls and DD-IPW with controls, reporting 
only the latter in the included tables. The results are broadly consistent across all three estimates. Full results are available upon 
request.
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IPW results of the programme impact on the proportion of food consumption that comes 
from own production. The treated households appear to consume more animal products, as 
well as other foods, from their own production compared to control households. The 
estimated treatment effect for change in dairy and eggs consumption from own production is 
about 13 percentage points, and the impact on other types of foods is about 4 percentage 
points. For most of the outcomes, the differential impact again appears to be bigger for 
households with smaller size and for female-headed households. The average treatment 
effect for the share of consumption from home produced dairy and eggs is 20 percentage 
points for smaller households and 15 percentage points for female headed households.
5.2. Investment in productive assets, input use and nonfarm activities
We look at investment in two types of productive assets: livestock ownership and 
agricultural implements. We also look at dimensions of the productive process to ascertain 
whether households have increased spending in agricultural activities. These include crop 
production, input use and credit use. Table 7 presents the impact of the CT-OVC on 
ownership of livestock assets estimated using the DD estimator with IPW. We used two 
indicators to measure the impact on livestock assets – the proportion of households owning 
each type of livestock and the total quantity owned (aggregated using tropical livestock unit 
or TLU). The results show a positive and significant impact only on the ownership of small 
livestock such as sheep and goats, for both smaller and female-household households. For 
smaller households, the estimated average treatment effect of 0.154 is equivalent to a 15.4 
percentage point increase in ownership of small livestock compared to control households, 
while female-household households receiving the transfer experienced a 6 percentage point 
increase in ownership of small livestock. Overall no impact is found on the number of 
livestock owned by households; however for smaller households, the total number of 
livestock (aggregated in Tropical Livestock Units) increased by 0.7 compared to control 
households. Given the relatively small amount of the transfer the lack of impact on cattle is 
not surprising; however, we would have expected some kind of positive impact on poultry 
ownership.3
Overall, as can be seen in Table 8, we find very little impact of the programme on direct 
indicators of crop production. This includes no impact over the share of households growing 
crops (and specifically improved maize), nor the share of crop producing households using 
different inputs (seeds, pesticides and organic and inorganic fertilizer). In fact, we find some 
small, but significant, negative impacts on the use of pesticides by large households and by 
female headed households. Similarly, we find no impact on input expenditures, with the 
exception of a negative impact on seed expenditure. It’s however important to point out that 
these results are based on SD-IPW estimation procedure which is not robust against time-
invariant unobservables therefore it should be interpreted with these caveats in mind.
Why are the results for the Kenya CT-OVC modest as compared to those of other 
programmes, such as the Malawi SCT (Covarrubias, et al, 2012; Boone, et al, 2013). Three 
3We also looked at the purchase of different kinds of animals using IPW with controls; no significant impacts were found, with the 
exception of a positive impact (but tiny magnitude) on sheep purchases for male-headed households. Results are available upon 
request.
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possible reasons emerge. First, the Kenya transfer was about half the size of the Malawi 
transfer at the time of their respective impact evaluations. Second, the value of the transfer 
was severely eroded over the period of the impact evaluation. And third, the Malawi SCT 
programme was also a pilot only implemented in one district (Mchinji) which is a relatively 
homogenous and vibrant agricultural economy while the Kenya SCT is implemented in four 
regions over seven districts which are heterogeneous both in terms of geography and 
economic activities.
As reported in table 3 approximately one third of households had some small business 
activity in 2011. Households reported that own savings were the principal first source of 
capital for their nonfarm enterprise while the CT-OVC transfer was reported as the most 
important second source of capital for female-headed households. This perception is 
confirmed in the econometric analysis, at least for women (Table 9); we find that the CT-
OVC transfer is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in household participation in a 
nonfarm enterprise, for female headed households, and an 11 percentage point decrease for 
male headed households (though statistically significant only at the 10 percent level). These 
findings are consistent with some other findings in the literature. For instance in Latin 
America, the Mexican PROGRESA programme increases the probability of operating a non-
farm microenterprise (Gertler et al., 2012; Todd et al., 2010). In South Africa, pension 
beneficiaries started or strengthened their own microenterprises (Du Toit and Neves, 2006). 
Lichand (2010) also finds that Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (CCT) programme was positively 
associated with entrepreneurial investments.
5.3. Impact on household labour allocation
As is common in the labour literature, we model labour supply as an individual decision, 
though we include a series of household and context variables as this decision takes place 
within the decision making process of the household and within a given economic context. 
We look at the two main types of labour supply: wage labour supply4, and labour used on 
own farm. For both types, we look at both the decision to participate, and then, conditional 
on participation, the intensity of participation. Note that since almost all wage employment 
in this sample is casual, whether agricultural or non agricultural, we make no distinction 
between casual and permanent labour. For both wage and own farm labour, we look at all 
individuals as well as disaggregated by gender, and we make a distinction between adults 
(older than 18 years in 2011) and children (between 10 and 15 years of age, inclusive). We 
further look at heterogeneity of impact by running four different specifications by 
interacting programme participation with different explanatory variables. In the first 
specification, no interaction variable is introduced while in the consecutive three 
specifications we have interacted programme participation with the family’s distance to 
local market, individual age and physical health (chronic illness) for adults.
4We also conducted analysis separately for agricultural wage labour and non agricultural wage labour. For each of these two types of 
wage labour types, we look at both the decision to participate in wage labour, and then, conditional on participation, the intensity of 
participation. Some of the results reported in Figure 4 are partly based on this disaggregated analysis. Detailed results are presented in 
the annex.
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An important element missing from the analysis is the impact related to time devoted to 
housework activities, as receipt of the programme may permit substitution between casual 
wage activities and pressing housework, including care of children (one of the objectives of 
the programme). Unfortunately data were not collected on adult time use, and thus we leave 
this question for future research.
5.3.1 Adult labour allocation—Table 10 reports the estimation results of the programme 
impact on adult wage labour supply. Overall, in terms of the propensity to participate in 
wage labour, we find no significant impact of the CT-OVC programme. For all individuals, 
but for women in particular, however, we find a positive and large impact (13 percentage 
points) of the programme for those who live farther from the local markets (more isolated). 
The programme thus appears to facilitate labour market participation for those who face 
higher transaction costs, in terms of distance to local market.
From the separate male equation, for all types of wage labour, we do find a negative and 
significant impact on participation. However, this negative impact decreases with increasing 
age, eventually becoming positive (Figure 4)5; indeed, for most relevant ages the impact on 
male participation on non agricultural wage labour is positive. Thus from this same figure, 
the positive impact of the programme on males is much stronger for non agricultural wage 
labour, while the negative impact is more relevant for agricultural wage labour, though even 
here the impact of the programme becomes less negative and eventually positive with 
increasing age. In terms of the participation of females in non agricultural wage labour, the 
trend is similar, though more muted. In terms of agricultural wage labour, however, the 
pattern is reversed; the programme has a positive impact on younger women, and this 
decreases with age, eventually becoming negative.
We also looked at the intensity of wage labour participation (days worked per year). Overall, 
the programme appears to have a negative impact on labour intensity (Table 10); 
participation in the CT-OVC programme is associated with a reduction in 20 days per year 
of all types of wage labour. No significant impact is found for the separate male and female 
estimations; however, in the male equation for all types of wage labour and for non-
agricultural wage labour, the interaction variable between gender of the head and treatment 
is significant. So the negative impact on labour supply among males is mostly concentrated 
among the male headed households. Among females, the heterogeneity impact of the 
programme by gender of the head is not significant in any of the equations6. The underlying 
story with regard to wage labour supply is that the CT-OVC programme overall tends to 
affect negatively the labour supply although the impact on the propensity to participate in 
5Some of the results reported in Figure 4 are partly based on this disaggregated analysis undertaken for agricultural and non-
agricultural wage labour. Figure 4 is plotted based on results from the third specification. Detailed estimation results are presented in 
the annex.
6Although results are not reported in this paper, we have also examined whether the programme impact is heterogeneous along a few 
dimensions including adult household size, gender of the head and also with regional dummies. The results seems to suggest a 
differentiated impact across region – treated individuals in the central province participate more in wage labor compared to individuals 
in the coastal areas and the same appears to be true for intensity of participation. Looking the differentiated impact across the size of 
households, we have not found differentiated impact in terms of the participation decision, though individuals in treated households 
with more adult household members tend to participate less intensively. Results of these interactions are not reported in this paper; 
however the full results can be available from the authors upon request.
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wage labour is insignificant. However, the negative impact of the programme on labour 
supply is more pronounced in adult male individuals compared to females.
Table 11 reports the estimation results of the programme impact on adult labour supply on 
own farm activities. A major hypothesis we would like to test with this analysis is to see if 
there are some sort of substitution between wage labour supply and labour used for own 
farm as a result of the programme. Unfortunately the results do not provide a conclusive 
narrative. Overall the programme does not have a significant impact on the decision to 
participate and labour supply on own farm. Also looking at the disaggregated analysis by 
gender and age, a similar story (initially negative, increasingly positive with age) is found 
for men in terms of their participation in own farm labour (Figure 4). Again, a similar trend 
is found for female participation in own farm labour - with older women, the programme 
impact eventually becomes positive. However for both males and females, participation in 
the programme leads to increasing intensity of own farm labour with increasing age7. 
Overall these findings of ours are not unique given the fact that the evidence so far shows 
mixed impacts on adult labour allocation as reported in the introduction section. Again it’s 
important to point out that these results are based on SD-IPW estimation procedure which is 
not robust against time-invariant unobservables therefore it should be interpreted with these 
caveats in mind.
5.3.2 Children labour allocation—Table 12 reports the impact of the programme on 
children participation in own farm labour. A significant percentage of children work on the 
family farm (42 percent), particularly boys (45 percent). We find that the programme results 
in a significant (12 percent) reduction in child labour on farm (Table 12)8. This impact 
appears to be concentrated among boys, as no significant impact is found on for girls. When 
the interaction term with distance to local markets is added, the results vary by gender. 
While we find that in the equation for all children the child labour reducing impact of the 
programme increases with increased isolation, with similar results for girls (though not 
statistically significant), for boys the impact of the programme is muted (by approximately 5 
percentage points) by increased geographic isolation. Parallel results also show that there is 
meaningful overall school enrolment impact at the primary and secondary level (age 12-18). 
While we can’t necessarily attribute the decrease in child labour to increase in school 
attendance, the two seem to go in the right direction. Our findings are consistent with 
overwhelming evidence that shows that several social protection programmes reduce child 
labour supply. In Latin America two major reviews find that most CCTs significantly lower 
child labour participation (Fiszbein and Shady, 2009). In South Africa, children residing in 
pension eligible households reduce their hours of work by 33% (Edmond 2006). In Malawi, 
the social cash transfer scheme decreases off farm child labour but increases child labour on 
the family farm (Covarrubias et al., 2012).
7We have also looked at the heterogeneous impact on own farm labour across different regions and the results show the same pattern 
like wage labour. Treated Individuals in the central and western province tend to participate more in own farm labour vis-à-vis treated 
individuals in the coastal province. However there seem to be no differentiated impact by adult household members in terms of 
participation in own farm labour. In contrary to the wage labour however we find a significant reduction of male labour use for own 
farm in female headed households. Again full results can be available upon request.
8Although results not reported, we find no impact of the CT-OVC programme on wage labour participation by children, which is not 
surprising given the fact that less than 2 percent of children aged 10-15 worked in wage labour.
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This paper used data collected from a four-year randomized experimental design impact 
evaluation (2007 and 2011) to analyze the productive impact of the Kenya CT-OVC 
including food consumption, accumulation of productive assets and labour allocation. 
Kenya’s CT-OVC is a national child-protection programme that provides a flat monthly 
transfer of Ksh 1500 to ultra-poor families with orphans and vulnerable children aged 17 
years and younger. Although the programme is designed to encourage care of OVC and 
human capital development, we find that this programme also has an impact on the 
productive activities of beneficiaries, who are primarily agricultural producers, but also 
diversified into casual wage labour and nonfarm enterprises.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the results of this study. First, we find robust 
evidence of a positive impact of the programme on consumption. Taking advantage of 
comparable baseline information, we find that treated households consumed significantly 
more cereals, animal products (meat and dairy) and other foods out of own production, as 
compared to control households. This is particularly true for both smaller size, and female 
headed, households. This indirect evidence is worth highlighting because underreporting of 
consumption is much less likely than underreporting or measurement error in income 
generating activities such as agricultural and non agricultural businesses.
Second, the programme has a significant impact on the accumulation of productive assets, 
particularly on certain subgroups within the evaluation sample. Large and significant effects 
on the share of households owning small animals are found for smaller households and 
female headed households. We also find that the CT-OVC transfer is associated with a 7 
percentage point increase in household participation in a nonfarm enterprise, for female 
headed households.
The final piece of evidence comes from labour allocation. The programme has a variety of 
impacts on labour supply, varying by gender and by type of labour. Overall, when grouping 
all types of labour and for all adults, we find no significant impact of the programme on 
participation in wage labour. For all individuals, however, and particularly for women, the 
programme facilitates labour force participation for those living farther from local markets. 
In addition, the programme is associated with a generally positive impact on participation in 
non agricultural wage labour (particularly for males), compared to generally negative impact 
on participation in agricultural wage. In both cases, however, the probability of participation 
increases with the age of programme beneficiaries. On the other hand, the programme 
appears to have a negative impact on wage labour intensity. Nevertheless for both males and 
females, participation in the programme leads to increasing intensity of own farm labour 
with increasing age. Unlike other studies which found a substitution between casual wage 
labour and own farm labour, this is not a pattern observed in our findings. At the same time, 
the programme leads to a significant reduction in child labour on farm, particularly for boys.
Overall, the study has provided evidence, direct and indirect, that the CT-OVC programme 
influences the livelihood strategies of the poor which is also differentiated across gender and 
household size. It seems clear that the programme has helped families increase food 
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consumption and productive assets, as well as provide more flexibility to families in terms 
of labour allocation, particularly for those individuals who are geographically isolated, and 
children, an important objective of the programme. From impact evaluation point of view, 
while we are somewhat constrained by incomplete data at base line, forcing us to rely on 
non-experimental measures for some indicators, together they point to the importance of 
considering impacts on household decision making on productive activities in the design and 
implementation of the programme.
The key findings from the overall analysis is that the positive productive impact of the 
programme either in terms of consumption or productive asset or even to some degree in 
labour allocation is more modest compared to other social cash transfer programme like the 
Malawi SCT programme. It is however important to point out that in separate analysis, the 
CT-OVC programme significantly increases secondary school enrolment and helps 
households avert meet transport costs and the cost of school supplies (The Kenya CT-OVC 
Evaluation Team, 2012). The programme alsosignificantly increases food expenditures and 
decreases spending on alcohol and tobacco (The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012). 
The programme has increased the real household consumption levels of recipient households 
substantially – by some 274 KSh per adult equivalent. The benefit of increased consumption 
is concentrated in smaller households, since the value of the transfer (per capita) is diluted in 
larger households, reinforcing the case for indexing the payments in some way to household 
size. Romeo et al. (2013) also found a positive impact of the programme on child health 
measured in chronic malnutrition or stunting. Taylor et al. (2012) simulated the local 
economy impact and revealed a minimal inflationary impact and real production value-
added multipliers of 1.58 Ksh per shilling transferred which suggests that that the 
programme may have lead to spillovers. Hence, the results discussed in the paper are 
underestimates of the actual impact of the programme. Therefore, it is important to frame 
our findings within the overall programme impact evaluation which goes beyond productive 
and economic activities and that in most of the human capital indicators the programme has 
a robust positive impact. We would have liked to also analyze heterogeneous effects for 
households that are credit constrained and households that are not credit constrained 
however we do not have sufficient data to analyze credit constraints in more detail. Thus 
future research should focus on heterogeneous effects for credit constrained and non-credit-
constrained households (Blattman et al., 2013).
Finally, studies have shown the programme to be cost effective. Ward et al. (2010) reported 
that in the three financial years from July 2006 to June 2009 the OVC-CT programme spent 
some $9.96 million in the seven pilot districts. The total expenditure per annum per 
household supported during 2007-9 was about $474, including the transfer and other 
transaction costs. About half of the total cost reached the beneficiary in the form of the cash 
transfer, at a time when the government was investing considerable sums in setting up the 
programme, reaching 15,000 households. At the current scale of the programme, the unit 
cost of the programme is most likely much reduced, but data are not available to provide 
exact figures. Expanding the programme to cover the poorest 25 percent of OVCs in Kenya 
at this unit cost was estimated to imply a total programme cost of around KSh 8.7 billion per 
annum. This represented around 0.3% of total GDP or about 1% of government expenditure, 
which suggests that it ought to be financially sustainable (Ward et al., 2010).
Asfaw et al. Page 19






















We believe that these results are relevant for other unconditional cash transfer programmes 
in SSAs. First, the results reported here are based on a rigorous and credible research design 
and thus can be taken as causal impacts of the programme. The only caveats for our analysis 
are related to the absence of baseline data for some outcome variables which in turn required 
the use of a SD estimator instead of a DD estimation strategy. Second, the institutional, 
market and economic context in Kenya is similar to other SSA countries currently initiating 
such programmes. Finally, the design features of the CT-OVC are also typical of other 
programmes in the region which include unconditional transfers, community involvement in 
beneficiary selection and targeting based on vulnerability and poverty rather than just 
poverty.
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Map of the evaluation sites
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Kernel density of the propensity score for the treated and control groups, household level 
weighting
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Kernel density of the propensity score for the treated and control groups, individual level 
weighting
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Impact of the programme on labour supply (participation) by age and sex of adult 
individuals, 2011.
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Table 1
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Table 2









Age of the head (years) 55.97 58.53 49.73 8.81***
Female headed household (1=yes) 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.06**
Household size 5.62 5.55 5.79 0.23*
Total non-active labour force in household 3.19 3.17 3.24 0.06
Elderly headed household (1=yes) 0.42 0.48 0.27 0.20***
Education of household head (years) 3.37 2.99 4.30 1.30***
Education of the spouse (years) 1.25 1.10 1.63 0.53***
Dependency ratio 1.49 1.49 1.50 0.01
Sex ratio 1.24 1.25 1.22 0.03
Number of household members
Under 11 years 2.04 1.97 2.20 0.23***
12-17 years 1.31 1.31 1.32 0.1
18-34 years 1.02 0.97 1.15 0.18***
35-49 years 0.37 0.33 0.48 0.16***
50-64 years 0.50 0.57 0.35 0.21***
Over 65 years 0.36 0.39 0.25 0.14***
Head was sick (1=yes) 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03***
Number of OVC in the household 2.47 2.50 2.38 0.13
Poverty Indicators
Number of adult member with over 8 years of educ. 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.04
Drinking water from unprotected sources (1=yes) 0.63 0.61 0.70 0.09***
Agriculture is the main source of income (1=yes) 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.05*
Main source of income is salaried employment (1=yes) 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03***
Main source of income is casual labour (1=yes) 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.02
Main source of income is self-employment (1=yes) 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.02
Main source of income is transfers (1=yes) 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.02
Household asset
Own bicycle (1=yes) 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.05***
Proportion of household who owns blankets 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.00
Proportion of household who owns mosquito net 0.62 0.59 0.69 0.11***
Total cultivable land owned by household (acres) 1.95 1.70 2.56 0.85***
Proportion of livestock owner 0.76 0.75 0.79 3.21***
Monthly consumption per capita (Ksh) 1285.98 1298.09 1256.40 41.69
Community level indicators
Access to road to the village (1=yes) 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.05**
Distance to local market (1=far) 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.07***
Share of household who can make telephone calls (1=high) 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.04**
Individual characteristics (N=7191) (N=5114) (N=2077)






























Age of the individual (years) 27.23 27.91 25.56 2.35***
Gender of the individual (1=female) 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.00
Marital status (1=married) 0.2 0.19 0.23 0.04***
Marital status (1=single) 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.01
Education of the individual (years) 2.52 2.42 2.75 0.33**
Individual is disabled (1=yes) 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02***
Unemployed 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.02**
in Wage labour 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
in Causal work 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.02**
in Off farm work 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence levels. Note also that the number of observations are different for 
household versus individual level variables
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Table 3








Owns non-farm enterprise (1=yes) 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.37
Share of households that operate land 0.80 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.82
For those that operate, land size in acres 2.67 2.20 2.96 2.52 2.90
Share of households that own land 0.76 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.76
For those that own, size in acres 2.58 2.15 2.86 2.45 2.79
Owns livestock (1=yes) 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.73 0.78
Access to credit (1=yes) 0.16 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.17
Share of households that own agricultural assets 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
N 1783 698 1085 1137 646
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Table 4














Works in casual wage labour (1=yes) 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.02
Works in agriculture wage labour (1=yes) 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01
Works in non-agriculture wage labour (1=yes) 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.01
Works in own agriculture (1=yes) 0.56 0.59 0.52 0.42 0.39 0.45
Labour intensity
Days per year in wage labour (man-days) 38.21 29.60 50.07 0.76 0.25 1.21
Days per year in agricultural wage (man-days) 10.28 9.79 10.97 0.65 0.19 1.04
Days per year in non-agricultural wage (man-days) 27.93 19.81 39.10 0.12 0.06 0.17
Days per month in own agriculture (man-days) 6.78 7.29 6.07 1.61 1.26 1.91
N 3965 2297 1668 2133 995 1138






















Asfaw et al. Page 32
Table 5
Impact on consumption of food groups in proportion - DD-IPW estimator (2007-2011)
All HH size <5
HH size 5

















































































N 1783 698 1085 1137 646
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at community level. Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence levels. 
T-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 6
Impact on proportion of food consumption from own production - DD-IPW estimator (2007-2011)
All HH size <5
HH size 5

















































































N 1706 680 1026 1087 619
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at community level. Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence levels. 
T-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 7
Impact on livestock ownership- DD-IPW estimator (2007-2011)







Proportion of household owning










































N 1706 680 1026 1087 619
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at community level. Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence levels. 
T-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 8
Impact on crop production - SD-IPW estimator (2011)
All HH size <5
HH size 5








































































































N 1706 680 1026 1087 619
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence levels. T-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 9










































N 1706 680 1026 1087 619
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at community level. Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence levels. 
T-statistics in parentheses






















Asfaw et al. Page 37
Table 10
Impact on wage labour supply by adults (age >18) - SD-IPW estimator (2011)
All adults Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Wage labour participation
Treatment −0.026 −0.053* −0.138 0.017 −0.009 −0.007 −0.091* −0.108* −0.527**
Treatment * distance to local 
market 0.129** 0.132* 0.072
Treatment * age 0.005 0.002 0.021*
Treatment * age squared −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
District fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 3,643 3, 643 3, 643 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,276 1,276 1,276
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.101 0. 098 0.117 0.119 0.116 0.12 0.12 0.126
F-test of joint significance 2.17* 16.20*** 2.51* 7.83*** 1.77 12.13***
Days worked per year
Treatment −20.41** −22.162* 39.603 −13.912 −17.357 58.556 −18.582 −27.71 46.016
Treatment * distance to local 
market 26.047 19.903 46.944
Treatment * age −2.539 −3.377 −3.017
Treatment * age squared 0.024 0.035 0.024
District fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 1,028 1,028 1,028 457 457 457 420 420 420
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.079 0.078 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.09 0.092 0.088
F-test of joint significance 1.7 3.31*** 0.60 0.52 1.46 1.55
Notes: The sample excludes Garissa district. Control variables used in the regression include individual level indicators (gender, age, education, 
health), household level proxies (gender, age, education, household size, dependency ratio, education), community level indictors (distance to 
market, access to road) and district level fixed effect.
***
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
**
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
*
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
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Table11
Impact on participation in own farm labour by adults (age >18) - SD-IPW estimator (2011)
All adults Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Participation in own farm labour
Treatment −0.047 −0.063* −0.107 0.007 −0.021 0.356* −0.055 −0.043 −0.115
Treatment * distance to market 0.077 0.143* −0.052
Treatment * age 0.001 −0.019** −0.002
Treatment * age squared −0.000 0.000** −0.000
District fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 3,643 3,643 3,643 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,276 1,276 1,276
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.340 0.342 0.342 0.222 0.222 0.230
F-test of joint significance 1.55 4.58*** 2.01 9.23*** 0.70 2.31**
Days worked per month
Treatment −0.042 0.058 −6.521 0.406 0.671 −12.198*** −0.622 −1.012 −0.233
Treatment * distance to market −0.491 −1.481 1.886
Treatment * age 0.330 0.503** −0.081
Treatment * age squared −0.003 −0.004* 0.002
District fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 2,184 2,184 2,184 1,084 1,084 1,084 671 671 671
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.133 0.136 0.235 0.235 0.247 0.223 0.223 0.224
F-test of joint significance 0.42** 5.75*** 1.86 7.25*** 0.18 5.00***
Notes: The sample excludes Garissa district. Control variables used in the regression include individual level indicators (gender, age, education, 
health), household level proxies (gender, age, education, household size, dependency ratio, education), community level indictors (distance to 
market, access to road) and district level fixed effect.
***
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
**
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
*
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
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Table 12
Impact on participation in own farm labour by children (10-15 years) - SD-IPW estimator (2011)
All Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment −0.124*** −0.120*** −0.120** −0.131** −0.072 −0.056
Treatment * distance to market −0.119 0.048 −0.085
District fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 1,909 1,909 998 998 901 901
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.138 0.142 0.141 0.109 0.109
F-test of joint significance 4.28*** 3.13** 1.14
Notes: The sample excludes Garissa district. Control variables used in the regression include individual level indicators (gender, age, education, 
health), household level proxies (gender, age, education, household size, dependency ratio, education), community level indictors (distance to 
market, access to road) and district level fixed effect.
***
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
**
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
*
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
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